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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Raymond Charles Marquez appeals from a jury verdict and final judgment
entered by Judge Scott N. Johansen on July 10, 2006, in the Carbon County
Seventh District Court. This Court has jurisdiction according to UTAH CODE
ANN.§

78-2a-3(2)(e) (Lexis 2007).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was Marquez's trial counsel ineffective for failing to request suppression

of Marquez's search and pre-Miranda confession statements prior to trial, for
failing to present any witnesses in Marquez's defense, and for failing to acquire
important evidence prior to trial?
a. Standard of Review: When a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the Court determines whether
counsel was effective as a matter of law, with review being highly
deferential in favor of counsel's performance. State v. Tennyson, 850
P.2d 461, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On January 5, 2006, Raymond Charles Marquez was charged with
possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, and possession of a controlled
substance and possession of a dangerous weapon by a Class I restricted person,
both third degree felonies. (R.l).
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At a jury trial on June 29, 2006, Marquez was convicted on all three counts
and was immediately taken into custody pending sentencing. (R.52; Tr. 109). On
July 19, 2006, the trial court entered its order sentencing Marquez to serve zero-tofive year terms in prison on Counts I and II, and six months in the Carbon County
Jail on Count III. (R.55). The court ordered that the sentences be served
concurrently with each other and concurrently with a sentence in another case. Id,
Defendant, acting pro se and through a purported attorney-in-fact, filed a
Motion For New Trial on July 25, 2006, and a Notice of Appeal and Motion for
Certificate of Probable Cause on July 26, 2007. (R.57, 62, 64). The trial court
denied the motions for a new trial and for a certificate of probable cause on
October 2, 2006. (R.90).
An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 8, 2006. (R.81).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 14, 2005, at approximately 10:15 p.m., Trooper Vasquez of the
Utah Highway Patrol stopped Raymond Charles Marquez for a broken taillight.
(Tr. 44). Marquez stopped his vehicle immediately upon being signaled by
Vasquez to stop. Id. Marquez was the only occupant of the vehicle. (Tr. 45).
Upon approaching the vehicle, Vasquez noticed a closed switchblade knife sitting
on the front passenger's seat and also noticed another knife near Marquez's leg.
(Tr. 45-46). Vasquez asked Marquez to exit the vehicle to separate him from the
knives. (Tr. 46). Vasquez immediately began searching Marquez for weapons.
(Tr. 46). During the search, Vasquez felt what he immediately suspected to be a
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marijuana pipe in Marquez's pocket. (Tr. 12,47-48). Vasquez asked Marquez
what the item was and what Marquez smoked with it. (Tr. 12, 48). Marquez
responded that it was used to smoke his "weed." (Tr. 12, 48). No weapons were
located on Marquez and no additional weapons were located in the vehicle. (Tr.
49). Vasquez placed Marquez under arrest and searched the vehicle and
Marquez's wallet, locating additional items of paraphernalia and meth residue.
(Tr. 49-50).
Prior to trial, trial counsel requested general discovery in the case, including
videotapes. (Tr.7). Counsel did not separately seek to subpoena the videotape of
the traffic stop and the videotape was not provided by the State as part of the
discovery process. Trial counsel did not file any pretrial motions and attempted to
present a motion to suppress evidence in the form of a motion in limine on the
morning of trial. (Tr.5-14). The trial court determined the motion to be untimely.
(Tr.14). Trial counsel then rested without presenting any witnesses in Marquez's
defense. (Tr.77).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Marquez's trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to request
suppression of the warrantless search and pre-Miranda confession in a timely
manner. Trial counsel also failed to call or present any witnesses in Marquez's
behalf and failed to adequately investigate all of the evidence in the case before
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trial. There is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Marquez's trial would
have been different if counsel's performance had not been deficient.

ARGUMENT
THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE
MARQUEZ'S TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE,
FAILED TO CALL WITNESSES IN MARQUEZ'S DEFENSE, AND
FAILED TO INVESTIGATE AND ACQUIRE IMPORTANT
EVIDENCE PRIOR TO TRIAL.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Marquez must
demonstrate that trial counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that "but for" counsel's deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the trial would have had a
different outcome. Myers v. State, 94 P.3d 211, 216 (Utah 2004). Importantly,
the Court indulges a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. Finally, to bring an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Marquez must be represented by different
counsel on appeal and the record must be adequate to permit decision of the issue.
State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 96 (Utah 2000).
1. The warrantless "weapons" search of Marquez was improper
because Trooper Vasquez did not reasonably suspect that Marquez
was armed or presently dangerous.
To determine whether a warrantless search and seizure was reasonable, the
trial court must evaluate the facts objectively and according to the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590, 594 (Utah 2003). With respect to a
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"Terry" or a "weapons" frisk, the police officer must be able to articulate specific
facts to show that the intrusion was appropriate under the circumstances. Id. An
officer may "perform a protective frisk pursuant to a lawful stop when the officer
reasonably believes a person is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or [to]
others." Id. Because traffic stops are inherently dangerous, that is part of the
totality of the circumstances to be considered by a court when evaluating an
officer's actions. Id. Despite the dangerousness of traffic stops, however, ordering
a person out of a vehicle or conducting a background check may allow the officer
to operate safely without unjustifiably intruding upon the rights of the individual.
Id at 597.
To justify a frisk, an officer must demonstrate "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the suspect may be armed and presently
dangerous." Id at 598 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, (1968).
In this case, Trooper Vasquez testified that the traffic stop was conducted at
about 10:14 p.m. (Tr. 44). Marquez stopped the vehicle immediately and Vasquez
determined that he was the sole occupant of the vehicle. (Tr. 44-45). Vasquez
saw a switchblade-style knife with the blade closed, resting on the passenger seat
in plain view and another knife that was also visible to Vasquez. (Tr. 45-46, 58).
There was no apparent attempt by Marquez to hide the knives. Vasquez asked
Marquez to get out of the car and immediately began searching him for weapons.
(Tr. 46). No weapons were located on Marquez's person and no additional
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weapons were located in the vehicle. (Tr. 49). Importantly, Vasquez had no
historical contact with Marquez to raise any concerns that Marquez might be a
risk. Vasquez stated that he had never had contact with Marquez and had no
information about whether Marquez had a criminal history. (Tr. 58, 60). Marquez
also appears to have been fully compliant throughout the encounter.
Based on the sparse trial record, the search in this case does not appear to be
justified under the circumstances. Vasquez did not articulate any specific facts at
trial to demonstrate that, after Marquez was outside of the car, he still feared for
his safety. Marquez did not act aggressively or make any furtive movement that
was consistent with aggression or with retrieving a weapon. The time of night was
not unusually late. The knives weren't concealed from view, even though one
knife was slightly less visible to Vasquez than the other. Marquez was compliant
during the stop and fully cooperated as requested.
The only fact tending to justify Vasquez's frisk (from the trial record) is
that there existed two knives in the car. The totality of all circumstances
surrounding this stop, however, don't demonstrate that Vasquez considered
Marquez to be a "presently dangerous" safety risk justifying a frisk. Also, there is
no indication that removal from the vehicle would not have sufficiently removed
Marquez from the knives and satisfied officer safety concerns.
Unfortunately, none of this information or argument was presented to the
trial court in an effort to suppress evidence acquired as a result of the illegal
search. Some effort was made to suppress Marquez's pre-Miranda confession
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during the search but the trial court ruled that the motion was untimely and was
untimely without just cause. (Tr. 14). As a result, Trooper Vasquez was never
adequately questioned about his concerns for officer safety or cross-examined to
determine whether those concerns were reasonable under the circumstances. The
record is inadequate to fully determine whether suppression is appropriate.
However, the record does adequately demonstrate that trial counsel was
ineffective. And if, as it appears from the sparse record, there are grounds to
suppress the Terry search, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial
would be very different and this matter should be remanded for a new trial and
suppression hearing because of counsel's ineffectiveness. Marquez should not be
held responsible to understand the legal complexities of presenting a trial and
suppressing evidence and he received little assistance in this regard.
2. Marquez's pre-Miranda confession that he possessed marijuana
pariphernalia was a result of the illegal frisk and should be
suppressed.
For similar reasons as set forth above, counsel ineffectively represented
Marquez at trial because efforts to suppress Marquez's confession were untimely
and no articulated legal authority was presented to the trial court to assist in
determining the issue.
In a factually similar case, a defendant made certain statements to law
enforcement prior to receiving a Miranda warning. State v. Bertoch, 2005 Ut.
App. 68 (Not for official publication). In Bertoch, the defendant admitted to
possessing a marijuana pipe and bag of marijuana after he was detained during a
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routine traffic stop. Id. The Court determined that the damaged condition of
defendant's automobile and smell of alcohol on his breath did not justify the frisk
and the search was illegal. Id. Ultimately, because the statements, whether
voluntary or not, were made during the course of an illegal search, the statements
had to be suppressed. Id.
In this case, trial counsel presented an untimely and unsupported
suppression motion to the trial court for consideration. It was not within the range
of "reasonable professional assistance" to deprive Marquez of his most plausible
defense. Had trial counsel adequately researched and timely presented a
suppression motion to the trial court referencing the illegality of the Terry frisk in
this case, there is a reasonable probability that Marquez's admissions would have
been suppressed and the outcome of trial would have been different.
3. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce any
evidence regarding the "dangerousness" of the weapons.
A "dangerous weapon" for purposes of Marquez's conviction is defined as
"any item that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-10-501(5) (Lexis 2007).
Interestingly, a knife is not presumptively a "dangerous weapon." Id. Rather, four
factors are provided by statute to determine if an item is a dangerous weapon. Id.
Two apply in this case: i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; and iv)
the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, or thing may be used.
Id.
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It is apparent from the statutory language that this is a factually driven
analysis. Nevertheless, trial counsel failed to call any witnesses to testify at the
trial regarding this or any other matter. (Tr. 77-79). There was some discussion at
trial regarding the possibility that these knives may have been used to cut shingles
or packages but no testimony about whether Mr. Marquez was so employed or
whether any individual had observed such a non-"dangerous" use. (Tr. 69-71). In
fact, trial counsel rested Marquez's case without calling a single witness to present
possible uses of the knives that were consistent with lawful possession.
Given the fact-based analysis to determine if a knife or other item is a
dangerous weapon, it was unsound trial strategy to assume that the State would be
unable to meet its burden of proof under the circumstances of this case and to
assume that no case presentation on behalf of Marquez was in his interest. Trial
counsel's strategy appears to be centered on demonstrating that the State had failed
to prove the elements of the crime through nothing more than cross-examination of
the State's witnesses. For this particular charge, that approach was unsound.
4. Trial counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare for trial by
examining all possible evidence, including a videotape of the traffic
stop.
At the outset of the case, trial counsel requested, among other requests,
"all...videotapes...which may be used in the prosecution" of the case. (R.7). It was
apparent at trial that there was a videotape of this traffic stop and trial counsel had
been informed on the morning of trial that such a tape existed. (R.55), Affidavit of
Samuel S. Bailey (in support of Rule 23B Motion.) Prior to trial, counsel had not
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sought to have the tape produced apart from the general discovery request filed on
March 13, 2006. Furthermore, when advised that the tape existed on the morning
of trial, counsel took no action to view the tape or to request a continuance to
determine whether the tape contained information that might be necessary to an
appropriate presentation of Marquez's case.
Although not supported by the record, it is common practice for law
enforcement to videotape traffic stops. Trial counsel should have known that the
tape existed and would be important to an adequate presentation of Marquez's
case. Even if used to simply verify the State's allegations and prepare appropriate
defenses, the tape was necessary to Marquez's defense.
Independently, each of the above deficiencies might not rise to the level of
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the cumulative effect is to deprive
Marquez of a fair trial. No witnesses were called when Marquez's defense to the
dangerous weapons charge was highly fact-specific. The videotape, though
perhaps not exculpatory, certainly needed to be viewed by trial counsel prior to
presenting his case, particularly since Trooper Vasquez viewed the tape
immediately prior to testifying. (R.55). Suppression motions were untimely
presented to the court and disguised as motions in limine.
In sum, trial counsel's performance was deficient and there is a
reasonable probability, particularly with regard to the suppression and
admissibility of evidence issues, that the outcome at trial would have been
different if the case had been properly prepared and presented.
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CONCLUSION
Marquez respectfully requests that this Court remand for a new trial due
to trial counsel's ineffective representation.
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LEXSEE 2005 UT APP 68

Q
Analysis
As of May 07, 2007
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Travis Bertoch, Defendant and Appellant.
Case No. 20030111-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2005 UTApp 68; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 77

February 17, 2005, Filed
NOTICE:
PUBLICATION

[*1]

NOT

FOR

OFFICIAL

Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne
JACKSON, Judge

PRIOR HISTORY:
Third Distnct, Salt Lake
Department The Honorable Dennis M Fuchs
State v Bertoch 2004 UT App 470 2004 Utah App
LEXIS 528 (2004)
DISPOSITION:

Reversed and remanded

COUNSEL: Lon Seppi, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L Shurtleff and Chnstine Soltis, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee
JUDGES: Norman H Jackson, Judge WE CONCUR
James Z Davis, Judge, William A Thorne Jr, Judge
OPINION BY: Norman H Jackson
OPINION
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION

l

1
This Amended Memorandum Decision
replaces the Memorandum Decision in Case No
20030111-CA issued on December 16, 2004
Footnote 1 of the onginal opinion has been
deleted

Travis Bertoch appeals the trial court's order denying
his motion to suppress as evidence a pipe and a plastic
bag of marijuana obtained by police during a traffic stop,
as well as certain statements he made at the scene He
claims police discovered this evidence after an illegal
frisk and that his statements were made pnor to receiving
a Miranda warning The trial court ruled that the pipe and
[*2] marijuana were admissible as part of a search
incident to arrest and that his statements were made
dunng a noncustodial police interview Upon this
determination, Bertoch entered a conditional guilty plea
to possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony We reverse the trial court's denial of Bertoch's
motion to suppress
"When a case involves the reasonableness of a search
and seizure, we afford little discretion to the district court
because there must be state-wide standards that guide law
enforcement and prosecutonal officials'" State v
Warren 2003 UT 36 P 12 78 P 3d 590 (quoting State v
Hansen 2002 UT 125 P 26 63 P 3d 650) '"In reviewing
the trial court's denial of [a defendant's] motion to
suppress, we examine the underlying factual findings for
clear error, and review the trial court's conclusions of law
based thereon for correctness "' State v Allred 2002 UT
App 291 P8 55 P 3d 1158 (citation omitted)
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First, Bertoch argues that the pipe and manjuana
discovered during the highway patrol trooper's initial
fnsk should be suppressed because, as Bertoch contends,
the trooper lacked a reasonable [*3] belief that Bertoch
was armed and dangerous We agree that the frisk was
improper A police officer "may perform a protective
fnsk pursuant to a lawful stop when the officer
reasonably believes a person is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or [to] others '" Warren, 2003 UT
36 at P 13 (quoting Terry v Ohio 392 US 1, 24, 20 L
Ed 2d 889 88 S Ct 1868 (1968)) "In determining
reasonableness, due weight must be given, not to [an
officers'] inchoate and unparticulanzed suspicion or
"hunch," but to specific reasonable inferences which [an
officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience "' Id at P 14 (quoting Terry, 392 US at 27)
(alterations in onginal) Here, the trooper's suspicion that
the missing trunk lid and misplaced license plate
indicated the car may have been stolen does not provide
sufficient grounds to perform a fnsk
The tnal court denied the motion to suppress,
holding that the evidence was obtained as part of a search
incident to arrest Although a police officer may perform
a search incident to arrest even before a suspect is
formally arrested, the officer must have "probable cause
[*4] to believe that the suspect has committed or is
committing an offense'" State v Trane, 2002 UT 97, P
26, 57 P 3d 1052 (quoting Michigan v DeFilhppo, 443
US 31, 36, 61 L Ed 2d 343, 99 S Ct 2627 (1979)) At
the time of the frisk in this case, the smell of alcohol on
Bertoch's breath and the condition of his automobile
could not provide the trooper with probable cause to
arrest him
Although the State indicates that the doctrine of
"inevitable discovery" may apply to admit the pipe and
manjuana, we may only affirm on such alternative
grounds if they are "apparent on the record" and
sustained by the trial court's factual findings State v
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, P9 76 P 3d 1159 Here, the tnal
court made its ruling from the bench and included only
cursory factual findings Given this limited information,
we can neither affirm on alternative grounds nor conclude
with certainty that the items would have been discovered

independently of the illegal fnsk
Second, the tnal court denied Bertoch's motion to
suppress his pre-Miranda statements
Specifically,
Bertoch seeks to suppress his admission, which was made
dunng the frisk, that he had marijuana in [*5] his pocket
and had smoked manjuana the night before It is clear
that such an admission may be suppressed if it was
obtained by means of police illegality "In determining
the validity of a confession or incnminating statements
following police illegality, two inquiries must be made
First, the court must determine
whether the
confession was voluntary, [and] second, the court must
determine
whether the confession was obtained in the
course of police exploitation of the pnor illegality " State
v Allen, 839 P 2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992) In considenng
the degree to which a confession is derived from police
exploitation of a prior illegality, the court should consider
"[(1)] whether Miranda warnings were given, [(2)] the
temporal proximity of the illegality and the confession,
[(3)] the absence or presence of intervening
circumstances, and [(4)] the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct " Id at 301 Here, Bertoch made the
statements dunng the course of the fnsk and in response
to what the officer found dunng the fnsk Regardless of
whether Bertoch's statements were voluntary, they were
made as a direct result [*6] of the illegal fnsk and must
be suppressed
In sum, we conclude that the trooper's frisk was
illegal and, as such, the pipe, manjuana, and Bertoch's
pre-Miranda statements regarding them must be
suppressed Accordingly, we reverse the tnal court's
denial of Bertoch's motion to suppress with regard to the
pipe, manjuana, and related statements and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision and
Bertoch's conditional guilty plea
Norman H Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR
James Z Davis, Judge
William A Thorne Jr, Judge

